From Islamic Modernism to Salafism: How a Reform Movement Changed Direction
In 1798, a French army landed in Egypt and took the country in a matter of weeks. For Muslims across the Ottoman world, the shock was not only military. The empire that had besieged Vienna a little over a century earlier now could not defend one of its richest provinces from a European expeditionary force with better artillery, better logistics, and a corps of scientists traveling with the troops. Over the next hundred years the pattern repeated: Algeria fell to France, India to Britain, Tunisia and Egypt to creditors and then occupiers. Muslim thinkers confronted a question that would define their century. What had gone wrong, and what was the remedy?
Two broad answers emerged, and for a time they lived inside the same movement. One said the remedy was to open Islam to modern knowledge, free it from rigid inherited scholarship, and reinterpret the sources for a changed world. The other said the remedy was to return to the faith of the earliest Muslims, stripped of later accretions. The thinkers who built Islamic modernism believed these were the same project. The story of how they came apart, and why, is the story of Rashid Rida. It is not a story of inevitable decline from liberalism into conservatism. It is a story about what happens when a movement’s central slogan, “return to the sources,” turns out to mean different things to different people.
Seeing Europe: Rifa’a al-Tahtawi
Rifa’a al-Tahtawi (1801–1873) was an Azhar-trained scholar sent to Paris in 1826 as imam of an Egyptian student mission. He stayed five years, learned French, read Montesquieu and Rousseau, and recorded his impressions in Takhlis al-Ibriz fi Talkhis Bariz (1834). He admired French schools, hospitals, scientific institutions, and the constitutional charter, and he went out of his way to find Islamic parallels for them, presenting justice and consultation as values Islam already contained. Back in Egypt he headed a school of translation under Muhammad Ali and his successors, producing Arabic versions of European works in geography, history, law, and the sciences.
Tahtawi matters here as context rather than as teacher. There is no line of direct instruction from him to the later reformers. What he supplies is a template: a pious Azhar scholar could look at Europe, find things worth borrowing, and argue that borrowing them was compatible with the faith. Early reformers generally did not treat modernity as a threat to religion. They treated institutional renewal as a duty.
Politics and Pan-Islam: Jamal al-Din al-Afghani
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897) turned that educational program into a political one. Born in Iran, though he claimed an Afghan origin, he moved through India, Egypt, Istanbul, Paris, and Persia, advising rulers and agitating against them with equal energy. He argued that Muslim societies had fallen behind because they had stopped reasoning, and he attacked taqlid, the unquestioning acceptance of the legal and theological conclusions of earlier authorities. He urged scientific education and, above all, Muslim political solidarity against European domination.
Afghani’s religious thought was loose and sometimes opportunistic. He could present himself as a pious reviver before a Muslim audience and as a rationalist philosopher before another. But his central insight shaped everything that followed: reform was no longer only about education. It was tied to power, to civilizational rivalry, and to the sense that Muslim decline was a problem to be diagnosed and solved. His Paris journal al-‘Urwa al-Wuthqa (1884), produced with his Egyptian disciple Muhammad Abduh, carried that message across the Muslim world before British authorities suppressed it.
Reason and Revelation: Muhammad Abduh
Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) is the pivotal figure. Trained at al-Azhar, drawn to Sufism in his youth, then converted to Afghani’s program of rational renewal, he was exiled after the ‘Urabi revolt of 1882, returned to Egypt, and rose to become Grand Mufti in 1899. His Risalat al-Tawhid (Treatise on Divine Unity) defended reason as a legitimate instrument for understanding revelation. He argued that Islam, properly understood, could not contradict established science, and that where apparent conflict arose, the interpretation rather than the revelation must give way.
He attacked taqlid to the established legal schools and called for renewed ijtihad, independent legal reasoning from the sources. He distinguished between the unchanging foundations of belief and worship and the historically conditioned rules governing social life, which could be revised. And he looked to the earliest Muslim community as a model of religious vitality, using the term salaf, “the predecessors,” to name the first generations whose faith he considered uncorrupted by later disputation.
That last commitment sits next to the others in tension. Abduh wanted to go back to the original sources. He also wanted to reinterpret them for a new age. For him these did not conflict, because he believed the earliest Muslims had reasoned freely and flexibly, and returning to them meant recovering that freedom. But the same appeal could be read differently. If the earliest generations were the standard, then perhaps their conclusions, and not only their method, were the standard. Abduh did not draw that inference. His student did.
The Turning Point: Rashid Rida
Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865–1935) was born near Tripoli, in what is now Lebanon, and educated in a traditional Syrian setting that included Sufi practice and some modern schooling. Reading al-‘Urwa al-Wuthqa convinced him that his future lay with the reformers. In 1897 he moved to Cairo, sought out Abduh, and in 1898 launched al-Manar, a journal that ran for decades and became the main organ of reformist thought across the Arab world and as far as Southeast Asia.
The Abduh years. In his first years in Cairo, Rida was recognizably Abduh’s disciple. Al-Manar promoted educational reform, defended ijtihad, attacked taqlid and the Sufi excesses of popular religion, and sought to show that Islam was compatible with progress. He recorded and published Abduh’s Qur’an commentary lectures, which became the basis of Tafsir al-Manar. Yet differences were visible even then. Malcolm Kerr, in Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida (1966), noted that Rida was more textual and more legally minded than his teacher, and more suspicious of philosophical theology. Abduh was willing to interpret figuratively where reason demanded it; Rida was warier of that move and kept pulling the discussion back to the report-based sources of Hadith.
After 1905. Abduh’s death removed the restraint his intellectual authority had imposed. Rida continued the commentary alone, and its later volumes show a more cautious approach to the rational interpretation of scripture and a heavier reliance on Hadith. His attention turned increasingly to bid’a, religious innovation, a category he applied to saint veneration, grave visitation, and elaborate Sufi ritual. He praised the Hanbali scholar Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), whose writings he helped republish, and who became a central authority for later Salafi thought. The concern with the salaf shifted in character: from a historical model of free inquiry to a doctrinal standard of correct belief, especially about God’s attributes, where Rida preferred the affirmation of the texts “without asking how” to Abduh’s tolerance for interpretive reading.
War and the Saudi turn. The First World War and its aftermath changed the political stakes. The Arab revolt against Ottoman rule, the British and French carving of the Arab provinces, and finally Mustafa Kemal’s abolition of the caliphate in 1924 left Rida without the political framework that his reformism had assumed. He had hoped for a reformed Ottoman state. What arrived instead was European mandate rule and a secular Turkish republic. In al-Khilafa aw al-Imama al-‘Uzma (1922–23) he laid out a theory of a reformed caliphate, led by a qualified mujtahid and advised by scholars and notables, as the institution that could give Islamic law a modern, authoritative form. As that hope collapsed, he looked for new carriers of the project, and found one in Ibn Saud, whose Najdi forces conquered the Hijaz in 1924–25.
Rida defended the Saudi conquest and the Wahhabi movement that legitimized it, publishing apologetic material in al-Manar and in works on the Wahhabis and the Hijaz. David Commins, in The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, shows that this was not simple convergence. Wahhabi scholars of the Najd had their own tradition, hostile to much of what Rida valued, and Rida’s reading of them was selective. He saw in the Saudi state a polity that applied Islamic law, suppressed shrine cults, and survived without European tutelage. He did not accept everything Wahhabism taught, and he continued to criticize the narrowness of some of its scholars.
What stayed and what changed. Rida never abandoned the modernist program. He continued to argue for ijtihad, to attack the blind following of the legal schools, to support modern education, and to defend the compatibility of Islam with modern science and with consultative government. What changed was the weight he gave each commitment. Abduh had treated the earliest generations as a source of method; Rida increasingly treated them as a source of content. Abduh trusted reason to adjudicate between competing readings; Rida trusted the Hadith corpus and the early authorities to limit what reason could conclude. And Abduh’s cultural confidence gave way to a defensive politics in which the main enemy was European domination and the secularism that accompanied it. Kerr’s phrase for Rida’s trajectory, a shift from modernism toward a more conservative reformism, captures this without implying that reason was simply discarded.
What Does “Salafi” Mean?
Here the scholarship matters, because the vocabulary can mislead. Henri Lauzière’s The Making of Salafism: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century (2016) argues that the label Salafi did not become the name of a distinct theological and religious identity until the early to mid twentieth century. Before that, salafi could describe someone who followed the creed of the salaf in matters of belief, a usage with medieval roots among Hanbali and some other scholars. But Afghani and Abduh did not call themselves Salafis, and the modern habit of calling them the founders of Salafism, popularized in part by the French orientalist Louis Massignon and later by Egyptian authors, reads a later category back into their lives. Lauzière’s account stresses that the term was shaped in the 1920s and 1930s by writers such as Rida, Muhammad Bahjat al-Bitar, and Taqi al-Din al-Hilali, who combined Rida’s reformism with Wahhabi-inspired creedal strictness, and that only afterward did it harden into the identity people recognize today.
Not every scholar accepts every part of that argument, and the debate remains active. Some historians emphasize earlier continuities, including the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Hadith revival and the legacy of Ibn Taymiyya, and Albert Hourani’s Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age treats Abduh as a more complex figure whose rationalism and appeal to the salaf did not conflict. Charles Adams, in Islam and Modernism in Egypt (1933), wrote closer to the events and framed Abduh as the leader of a modernist school, not a Salafi one. The safest conclusion is that the nineteenth-century appeal to the salaf was a reformist rhetorical resource, and that modern Salafism, as a self-conscious identity with a specific creed, was assembled later from several sources, with Rida as one of the main bridges. Contemporary Salafism is not simply Abduh’s movement continued.
Three Tensions
The change in Rida’s emphasis makes the most sense as the working out of three tensions that were already present.
The first is reason versus tradition. Reformers attacked the authority of centuries of inherited jurisprudence, but a replacement authority was needed. Abduh’s answer was reason guided by the spirit of the sources. Rida’s answer, under pressure, leaned toward the textual record of the earliest community. Whichever was chosen, someone had to decide which reports were reliable and which interpretations were sound, and that required a method the reformers had not fully specified.
The second is reform versus restoration. If decline came from a failure to adapt, the solution was to build new institutions and reinterpret the law. If it came from departure from the original faith, the solution was to remove later additions. The two diagnoses can coexist for a time, because both involve criticizing the status quo, but they imply different programs.
The third is modernization versus religious authenticity. Could Muslim societies adopt modern science and administration while holding to an early standard in theology and law? Rida believed so, and his later career is an attempt to hold both. The tension was real, though, and it shaped how successors chose between them.
Conclusion: Who Decides What the Original Faith Was?
The reformers began from a shared diagnosis: Muslim societies were stagnating under the weight of inherited authority, and the cure lay in recovering the faith of the earliest Muslims and applying it to a changed world. That formula was powerful because it was flexible. For some, returning to the foundations meant escaping medieval constraints and welcoming modern knowledge. For others, it meant restoring doctrinal boundaries and practices attributed to the first generations.
Rida embodies both. He never ceased to be a reformer, and he never stopped defending independent interpretation, yet he gave the weight of the early community a more fixed and doctrinal meaning than his teacher had. The outcome was not inevitable. Different circumstances, a longer life for Abduh, a different end to the First World War, might have produced a different Rida. But the question his career raises is not confined to him. When religious reformers call for a return to the original faith, who determines what that original faith actually was, and by what method?
A Note on al-Afghani
The portrait of al-Afghani above follows the mainstream scholarly account, but his reputation is contested, and readers should know the main charges. The most systematic case was made by Elie Kedourie in Afghani and ‘Abduh: An Essay on Religious Unbelief and Political Activism in Modern Islam (1966). Kedourie argued that both men were privately skeptics who used the language of Islamic revival as a political instrument, and he pointed to several pieces of evidence. Al-Afghani concealed his Iranian and Shia origins behind an Afghan Sunni identity. He was expelled from Istanbul in 1870 after a lecture that scandalized the religious establishment. He led a Masonic lodge in Cairo, and a British report recorded his expulsion from it for professing disbelief in a Supreme Being. His 1883 reply to Ernest Renan, written for a French audience, conceded that religions in general, Islam included, hinder scientific progress. Indian intelligence files reportedly record an offer on his part to serve British interests in Egypt, and his later movements took him between British, Russian, French, and Ottoman patrons. Abduh’s later career under Lord Cromer’s patronage, culminating in the office of Grand Mufti, has drawn the same suspicion, and a letter attributed to Abduh describing “performing the acts of worship” while pursuing another path has circulated as proof of double dealing, though its authenticity is disputed.
None of this is settled. Kedourie has been criticized for hostile readings and for treating ambiguous evidence as proof of unbelief, and Nikki Keddie’s Sayyid Jamal ad-Din “al-Afghani”: A Political Biography (1972) gives a more sympathetic account that takes his shifting audiences and strategies seriously without concluding that his religious arguments were insincere. The charge of bad faith has also been used as a weapon against Muslim reformers by colonial-era writers and by modern opponents of reform. What the record supports is a complicated figure who tailored his message to his audience and dealt with several powers at once. Whether he privately believed what he preached remains an open question, and the intellectual history traced in this article does not depend on the answer: his arguments for ijtihad, against taqlid, and for political and educational renewal shaped the people who read them whatever his private convictions were. For a fuller treatment of the accusations and the evidence behind them, check out the following article:
Bibliography
Adams, Charles C. Islam and Modernism in Egypt: A Study of the Modern Reform Movement Inaugurated by Muhammad ‘Abduh. London: Oxford University Press, 1933.
Commins, David. The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. London: I.B. Tauris, 2006.
Commins, David. Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in Late Ottoman Syria. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Hourani, Albert. Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939. London: Oxford University Press, 1962.
Kerr, Malcolm. Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966.
Lauzière, Henri. The Making of Salafism: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century. New York: Columbia University Press, 2016.
Primary works discussed: Rifa’a al-Tahtawi, Takhlis al-Ibriz fi Talkhis Bariz (1834); Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, al-‘Urwa al-Wuthqa (1884); Muhammad Abduh, Risalat al-Tawhid; Rashid Rida, al-Khilafa aw al-Imama al-‘Uzma (1922–23), and the journal al-Manar (1898–1935).
