The Houthi Balancing Act After Israel’s Attack on Iran
OPINION — How will the Houthis respond to the devastating Israeli strikes on Iran? This moment could prove decisive for both the Iran-led axis and the Houthis’ role within it. Historically, the Houthis have demonstrated a high tolerance for risk. This approach has allowed them to achieve far more than many would have thought possible a decade ago. At the same time, they are strategic actors who consistently prioritize their position within Yemen above all else. With that in mind, there are three key reasons to assess that the Houthis will play a limited supporting role in responding to Israeli strikes on Iran, one that aligns with Tehran’s objectives but does not place them at the forefront of the response.
In determining how to respond, there are practical considerations related to how the Houthis perceive themselves and choose to represent their role in the Iran-led axis. Unlike Hezbollah, the Houthis have never pledged allegiance to Tehran. Instead, they view Iran as a partner in a mutually beneficial relationship, rather than as a command authority. On multiple occasions, Houthi leaders have publicly pushed back against statements by Iranian officials that implied the group acts at Iran’s direction, reaffirming instead that they are asserting Yemeni sovereignty.
While their attacks on Israel and Red Sea shipping in support of Gaza and Hamas may have resonated with some segments of the Yemeni public, escalation in direct support of Iran would likely receive far less domestic backing and could reinforce perceptions that the group has actively sought to dispel. Within the hierarchy of the Axis of Resistance, the Houthis may not feel compelled to do much, especially given that even Hezbollah (which Iran specifically built up for this scenario and was long considered the “crown jewel of proxies”) has reportedly stated it will not initiate hostilities. Furthermore, Sanaa’s sense of obligation to take a leading role in the response will likely be limited by the fact that Iran did not directly intervene when the Houthis endured a two-month-long U.S. bombardment earlier this year.
In addition, since Iran has likely suffered a significant setback that disrupts its ability to export key components, such as those used in ballistic missiles, the Houthis may choose to expend their existing stockpiles judiciously rather than risk using or trading them without a source or timeline for replenishment. Although the Houthis have made a concerted effort to develop their domestic military industry and have achieved some progress, they remain heavily dependent on Iran for critical components of their most advanced weaponry. Their attempts to diversify suppliers have met with limited success. For example, they have sought to engage Russia in hopes of purchasing ship-to-shore missiles and other advanced arms, but these efforts have yet to yield substantial results. This could also undermine emerging partnerships with other non-state actors, such as al-Shabab in Somalia, since the Houthis’ main appeal to the Somali branch of AQ appears to be their access to advanced weapons from Iran.
Despite these limiting factors, the Houthis will likely provide direct support to Iran in some capacity. As the proverb goes, “a friend in need is a friend indeed.” If the group is able to distract, disrupt, or even symbolically respond to Israeli actions at a time when the Iranian military is struggling and other proxies are unwilling to act, it would reinforce the Houthis’ position as Iran’s new “crown jewel” after Hezbollah’s decline. To that end, if Iran finds itself unable to respond adequately in the immediate term, it may offer the Houthis additional “incentives,” like cash, weapons, or other goods, to do so. Even from a purely self-interested perspective, any effort the Houthis make to avert the decimation of Iran’s defense apparatus and military production infrastructure could help to preserve the flow of advanced weaponry into Yemeni hands. Further down the line, Houthi support for Iran during this challenging moment could even enhance the group’s appeal to other rogue states or non-state actors exploring potential partnerships with it.
In responding, the Houthis may struggle to fully grasp or align with Iran’s intended course of action. At the same time, Iran faces the challenge of interpreting the U.S. attitude to the current hostilities and is unlikely to take steps that could invite direct American involvement. As a result, the Houthis will feel most comfortable sticking to their current lane, with limited, sporadic missile and drone attacks on Israel.
While its likely that the Houthi regime could survive without Iranian support, its role would be significantly diminished. The Houthis are uniquely dangerous not simply because of their voracious appetite for risk, which is common among terrorist groups, but because of their access to large quantities of advanced weaponry and other technical support which mostly originate in Iran. Given the choice between remaining passive and positioning themselves as the tip of the spear for Iran’s defense, the Houthis will likely opt for a middle course that prioritizes the group’s own survival while doing the minimum necessary to try to keep Tehran afloat.
Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.
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